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Abstract 
An April 2015 World Bank report on the Millennium Development Goal poverty target has revealed 
that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa. This 
study extends the implications of Thomas Piketty’s celebrated literature from developed countries to 
the nexus between developed nations and African countries by building on responses from Rogoff 
(2014) and Stiglitz (2014), post Washington Consensus paradigms and underpinnings from Solow-
Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana. The central argument presented is that the inequality problem is 
at the heart of rational asymmetric development between rich and poor countries. Piketty has shown 
that inequality increases when the return on capital is higher than the growth rate, because the poor 
cannot catch-up with the rich. We argue that when the return on political economy (or capitalism-
fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate in African countries, inequality in 
development increases and Africa may not catch-up with the developed world. As an ideal solution, 
Piketty has proposed progressive income taxation based on automatic exchange of bank information. 
The ideal analogy proposed in tackling the spirit of African poverty is a comprehensive commitment to 
fighting illicit capital flight based on this. Hence, contrary to theoretical underpinnings of exogenous 
growth models, catch-up may not be so apparent. Implications for the corresponding upward bias in 
endogenous development and catch-up literature are discussed.  
 JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O19; O55 
Keywords: Piketty, Inequality, Foreign aid, Capital flight, Development  
Acknowledgements  
The authors are indebted to the editor and referees of this journal for 
constructive comments.  
1. Introduction 
“Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming 
poorer” (Lewis, 1955). “Lewis led all developing countries to water, proverbially 
speaking, some African countries have so far chosen not to drink” (Amavilah, 
2014). While Piketty’s (2014) celebrated ‘capital in the 21st century’ is consistent 
with Lewis, it has taken only developed countries to the stream. The present 
study aims to correct this shortcoming by extending the implications of Piketty’s 
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findings to African countries. The relevance of Africa is also motivated by a 
recent World Bank report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
poverty target which has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all 
regions of the world with the exception of Africa (Caulderwood, 2015; World 
Bank, 2015), despite the continent enjoying more than two decades of growth 
resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p. 44)1. In what follows, 
we show why it is important to extend Piketty’s celebrated literature because the 
growing evidence of inequality as a challenge to 21st century capitalism extends 
beyond the scope of developed countries (Brada & Bah, 2014). 
Irrational policies are increasingly driving exclusive development (Li et al., 
2011, p. 109) due to ‘immiserizing growth’2 (Bhagwati, 1958). According to some 
accounts (Asongu & De Moor, 2015), the Top 1 percent have gained most, if not 
all, of the revenue accruing from the recent economic recovery (Covert, 2015). 
Since income inequality has substantially increased over the past decade 
Milanovic, (2011) and Oxfam (2015) sustain that the income of the Top 1 
percent in the World could exceed that of the Bottom 99 percent by the year 
2016. Consistent with Joseph Stiglitz: “There has been no improvement in well-
being for the typical American family for 20 years. On the other side, the top one 
percent of the population gets 40 percent more in one week than the bottom 
fifth receive in a full year”(Nabi, 2013, p.10). Therefore, there is an imperative 
“Need to design the right economic policies to enhance inclusiveness specially in 
the developing countries” (Nabi, 2013, p. 13). Reducing exclusive development 
would require, inter alia, improving how finance drives growth (Freeman, 2010). 
A position that is broadly shared by the World Hunger (2010) which has 
concluded that the principal cause of poverty and hunger in the globe today is a 
mainstream economic system that has encouraged the minority to grab most of 
the global wealth, such that the bottom billion is abandoned just to survive.  
As far  as we have searched, responses to the work of Piketty have included 
reviews and commentaries of a diverse nature. These entail: cross-checking of 
facts (Branko, 2014: Krusell & Smith, 2014), data quality (Reynolds, 2014), 
reviews (Homburg, 2014; Allen, 2014), theoretical foundations (Morgan, 2015), a 
need for a more general approach to the global inequality problem (Rogoff, 
                                                 
1 The concern about immiserizing growth on the continent has motivated a recent stream of 
studies on ‘paradigm shifts’. Notably, Kuada (2015) has proposed a new paradigm of ‘soft 
economics’ in a recent book in order to elicit poverty trends in Africa. The concern about 
exclusive growth is also the focus of another book by Fosu (2015bc) which is devoted to 
elucidating: (i) myths behind Africa’s recent growth resurgence and (ii) the role of 
institutions in the underlying resurgence. 
2 Economic growth can be associated with substantial negative externalities, producing 
disequalizing income-distribution. The presence of such a scenario debunks the 
celebrated inverted U-shape nexus between inequality and industrialisation advanced by 
Kuznets (1955, 1971).  
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2014a; Stiglitz, 2014 ). Among the above responses, those of Rogoff and Stiglitz 
are the closest to the present line of inquiry.  
According to Rogoff (2014a), Piketty’s approach to the inequality problem 
should not have been limited to developed countries. The narrative argues that it 
should also have incorporated developing (especially African) nations because the 
poor in developed countries may be considered super-rich in relative terms when 
perceived from less developed countries’ point of view. Moreover, the notion 
that inequality should be grounded exclusively in capitalism has some 
fundamental shortcomings when issues like colonialism and slavery, among 
others, are considered. Accordingly, the externalities of colonialism have 
substantially contributed to global inequality (Frankema, 2006). Stiglitz (2014) has 
claimed that institutions like democracy matter more in ‘21st century inequality’ 
than does to capitalism. According to his narrative, “If we get the rules of the 
game right, we might even be able to restore the rapid and shared economic 
growth that characterized the middle-class societies of the mid-twentieth 
century”. Two elements boldly standout from the above narratives: the need to 
integrate less developed countries and the imperative to get institutions rights 
from Rogoff and Stiglitz respectively. These elements have led to a growing 
stream of post-Washington Consensus (WC) development models. Hence, 
before we consider how the two elements underpin this study, it is worthwhile to 
briefly highlight the post-WC models in order to enhance readability and clarity. 
Hence, in what follows, for the purpose of consistency, the discussed post-WC 
paradigms are centred on institutions and the middle class.  
A recent critical comment by Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2014) on 
institutions and poverty clearly articulates the importance of the middle class and 
inequality in the post-WC development agenda. These include, Liberal 
Institutional Pluralism (LIP), New Structural Economics (NSE) and the Moyo 
Conjecture reconciling the WC with the Beijing Model (BM). In essence, China’s 
outstanding economic development has led to a new stream of studies clearly 
articulating the middle class and institutions as prime factors in the post-WC 
development agenda. These include: debunking the myths surrounding Sino-
African relations (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013), convergence between the BM and 
WC in a new development paradigm (Asongu, 2014a, 2016; Asongu & Ssozi, 
2015), greater need for self-reliance by African countries in charting their course 
to development (Fofack, 2014), the false economics of pre-conditions (Monga, 
2014), development strategies based on a mixture of successful development 
models with the WC (Fosu, 2013a), the NSE (Lin & Monga, 2011; Norman & 
Stiglitz, 2012; Stiglitz et al., 2013ab; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013) advancing a synthesis 
between liberalism and structuralism, the LIP3 based on quality and types of 
                                                 
3 We discuss this school of thought in substantive detail in Section 2. The interested reader 
can find more insights in Acemoglu et al. (2005), Rodrik (2008), Brett (2009) and Fofack 
(2014, pp. 5-9).  
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institutions in public service delivery (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2008; Brett, 
2009; 2014, pp. 5-9) and the Moyo Conjecture which has been partially 
confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014b) and a broad sample of developing counties 
(Lalountas et al., 2011)4.  
As we shall substantiate in latter sections, it is important to articulate how 
post-WC models are linked to the extension of Piketty’s findings to developing 
countries. For instance, while the Moyo conjecture emphasises that political 
rights should be prioritised because they mitigate inequality in the long-run 
(Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a), Stiglitz (2014) in responding to Piketty, has 
sustained that democracy is the principal cause of inequality in the 21st century. 
A logical implication of this contradiction is that the issues at play may revolve 
beyond the underlying debates to more in-depth realities that limit both 
democracy and economic rights in developing countries, even in the presence of 
burgeoning economic growth.  
In light of the above, less developed countries, the middle class and 
institutions are necessary to extend the implications of Piketty in the context of 
post-WC development models. Therefore, building on responses from Rogoff 
(2014a) and Stiglitz (2014), we argue that the inequality problem between 
developed nations and African countries is at the centre of rational asymmetric 
development. Piketty has shown that inequality increases when the return on 
capital is higher than the growth rate. We argue that when the return on political 
economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate 
in African countries, inequality in development increases. The intuition for the 
parallel analysis is fundamentally based on high levels of illicit capital flight from 
African countries, far outweighing economic growth rates (OECD, 2014)5. 
Moreover, it is important to involve less developed countries in the inequality 
agenda because Piketty’s literature has been celebrated on the prime basis that it 
has debunked the Kuznets’ conjectures. But the conjectures of the latter were 
based on a comparison between developed and developing countries. Hence, the 
comparative scope of the present line of inquiry is granted and relevant to 
providing a more complete perspective of the implications of Piketty’s study.  
To the best of our knowledge, the study in African development literature 
closest to the current line of inquiry is Fofack (2014, p. 13) which reviewed 
different ideas proposed for African development over the past decades and on a 
                                                 
4 There is a growing stream of literature emphasising that ‘political rights institutions’ are more 
endogenous to economic growth (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Asongu, 2014c). The Moyo 
proposal/hypothesis is founded on the Kuznet’s (1955) conjecture which has been recently 
debunked by Piketty’s (2014) ‘Capital in the 21st century’.  
5 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2014), about 25% of African GDP is lost to corruption, of which a substantial portion is 
capital flight that is deposited in OECD tax havens. If this 25% is compared with the 
average growth rate of 5% on the continent, there is some rationale for inferring that the 
rate of illicit capital fight might far outweigh the growth rate.  
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development path based on self-reliance. This study consolidates the view of 
more self-reliance by extending the conclusions of Piketty’s celebrated literature 
to African countries. Hence, the present paper steers clear of past models of 
African development. These include, among others: the Lagos Plan of Action for 
Economic Development (LPA, 1980-2000); Africa’s Priority for Economic 
Recovery (APPER, 1986-1990); the African Charter for Popular Participation for 
Development (1990); the African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programme for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-
SAP, 1989) and the 2001 New Partnership for African Development: NEPAD 
(OAU, 1980, 2001; Adedeji, 2002; Bujra, 2004).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 relates Piketty’s 
work to post- WC models. In Section 3, we ask why Kuznets and developing 
countries are important elements in the 21st century inequality agenda. 
Underpinnings for ‘rational asymmetric development’ and ‘the spirit of poverty’ 
are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we extend the Piketty’s conclusions by 
building on responses from Rogoff (2014a) and Stiglitz (2014) and underpinnings 
from Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana. This section also discusses 
implications for an upward bias in the endogenous development and catch-up 
literature. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Piketty and post-Washington Consensus (WC) models 
This section links Piketty’s work to post-WC models. The discussion 
follows five main strands: the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New 
Structural Economics (NSE); the Beijing Model (BM), WC and the Moyo 
Conjecture; issues in a development consensus reconciling the BM and WC 
models; resulting ambiguities on which this present line of inquiry is positioned 
and challenges to the new paradigms.  
In the first strand, there are two principal streams of post-WC models that 
have gained prominence after the 2008 financial crisis (Fofack, 2014, p. 9). These 
models are consistent with Piketty’s literature on the failure of the capitalist 
model of development. Fofack is even more critical in clearly articulating how the 
‘private capitalism’ experiment has failed in Africa. For instance, going by the 
definition of the WC as ‘government policies based on privatisation, 
marketisation and liberalisation’, African countries have lost decades subscribing 
to the prescriptions of WC. In essence, the poor economic performance of most 
developing countries have been traceable to structural adjustment policies based 
on the underlying WC for the most part (Fofack, 2014, p. 5-6; Lin, 2015).  
The NSE has been presented by Chang (2002), Lin and Monga (2011), 
Norman and Stiglitz (2012), Stiglitz et al. (2013ab), Stiglitz and Lin (2013) and Lin 
(2015) who have advocated a synthesis between the structuralism and liberalism 
ideologies. According to the narrative, the authors have recognised both state and 
market failures but have failed to provide a unified economic development theory 
for the purpose. The LIP is oriented towards institutions that are needed at 
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various stages of the development process. It has focused on inter alia: 
institutional conditions for successful growth, institutional diversity and 
institutions for the effective delivery of public commodities (Brett, 2009; Rodrik, 
2008; Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 1990). While Piketty’s work is related to the 
above on the need to rethink the WC, the argument in the current paper is 
aligned with the need for a post-WC paradigm that integrates certain specificities 
of African development which directly built on implications of ‘capital in the 21st 
century’.  
Moyo (2013) in the second strand has defined the BM as “state capitalism, 
de-emphasised democracy and priority in economic rights” while the WC is 
“private capitalism, liberal democracy and priority in political rights”. According 
to the narrative, the WC (BM) should be a long- (short-) run development model 
because the WC is more inclusive and sustainable relative to the BM. In essence, 
a burgeoning middle-class is needed for political rights to be demanded in a 
sustainable manner: a middle class that would avoid the temptation of being 
strongly influenced by basic economic needs like food, clothing and shelter. In a 
nutshell, what is now coined as the ‘Moyo conjecture’ sustains that economic 
rights should be prioritised at the early stages of development while political 
rights should be given priority at more advanced stages of economic 
development. It should be noted that the Moyo conjecture is aligned with the 
LIP because it clearly identifies institutions that are needed at various stages of 
economic development. According to this view, economic institutions should 
precede political institutions in terms of development priorities (see Asongu & 
Ssozi, 2015; Asongu, 2016).  
In the third strand for reconciling the BM with the WC, two important 
points are noteworthy. First, the Moyo conjecture is substantially based on the 
Kuznets nexus between inequality and industrialisation because it assumes that 
the WC would mitigate inequality in the long-run at a faster rate than the BM. 
Second, Piketty’s literature has debunked the Kuznets underpinnings on which the 
Moyo conjecture is based. Given that the WC is the development model applied 
in most of the sampled countries on which Piketty’s findings are based, issues 
surrounding the paradigms are open to debate because the Moyo conjecture and 
Kuznets’ underpinnings are based on comparative analyses between developed 
nations and developing countries.  
We devote some space to discussing how the attempt by the Moyo 
conjecture to merge the NSE and LIP has left room with which to motivate the 
positioning of this study, that is rational asymmetric development and the spirit 
of poverty in Africa. First, on the foregoing relationship with the LIP, the 
conjecture has complemented the paradigm by clearly articulating an institutional 
design of development. In line with the narrative, the transition from low-income 
to higher- income should be accompanied by a trading-off of ‘economic rights 
priorities’ for ‘political rights priorities’. Second, the NSE paradigm is 
complemented by laying down some foundations for a unified economic theory 
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that accounts for both market and state failures. In essence, whereas the 
proposed BM as a short-run development, preference favours prudence in 
economic openness and state regulation, the WC (or long-term) alternative is 
opposed to the stated preferences.  
A substantial challenge to the NSE paradigm (see Acemoglu et al., 2005, p. 
387) is the absence of some kind of causal nexus between economic growth and 
a specific institutional design. Asongu (2014a) argues that this conjecture has 
tackled the issue by establishing that economic and political institutions should 
have priority in the early or latter stages of industrialisation. This contribution has 
steered clear of the fundamental ‘one-size fits all’ framework which does not 
incorporate the structural and institutional challenges at various stages of the 
development process. In the same vein, while political rights should be prioritised 
because they mitigate inequality in the long-run (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a), 
Stiglitz (2014) in responding to Piketty, has sustained that democracy is the 
principal cause of inequality in the 21st century. A logical implication of this 
contradiction is that the issues at play may revolve beyond the underlying debates 
to more in-depth realities that limit both democracy and economic rights in 
developing countries, notwithstanding burgeoning economic growth.  
In Africa for instance, where poverty has been substantially documented to 
be associated with huge volumes of illicit capital flight (Fofack & Ndikumana, 
2010, 2014; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 2014d), neither 
democracy nor sustainable economic rights might be achieved despite the 
apparent economic growth. In this context, the implications of Piketty’s work 
may hold valuable lessons for development economics when extended to African 
countries in light of the theoretical underpinnings of the catch-up literature. But 
before we engage in this dimension, more foundations need to be discussed in 
subtle detail, inter alia: underpinnings for the ‘rational asymmetric development’ 
and the ‘spirit of poverty’ as well as motivations for including developing 
countries and Kuznets in debates on 21st century inequality.  
3. Kuznets and developing countries have motivated responses to Piketty 
‘Capital in the 21st century’ has featured prominently in most scholarly 
debates in recent months because it has debunked the widely celebrated Kuznets’ 
(1955, 1971) conjecture on an inverted U-shape relationship between inequality 
and industrialisation. For brevity and lack of space, we resist discussion of the 
Kuznets’ theory. What is more relevant for the present inquiry are the following 
two questions. First, is there a stream of literature on inequality in developing 
countries consistent with the narrative of Piketty? Second, why should 
developing countries matter as much as developed nations in the celebration of 
Piketty’s work? 
To the first question, we have already highlighted the notion that the 
Kuznets conjectures on which the celebration of Piketty’s work substantially 
draws is based on a comparison between developed and developing countries. 
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Hence, it is only natural that the findings of this literature be extended to a broad 
sample of developing countries. But of more direct bearing to this line of defence 
is Rogoff’s (2014a) response on issues of 21st income inequality. Why only 
capitalism? Why not colonialism? If capitalism is not fair for developed countries 
in terms of equalized income distribution, the issue should be more serious in 
former colonies. According to Rogoff, while the brilliant work of Piketty has 
documented within-country inequality from rich countries, a substantial part of 
the cultural groundswell around his book emanates from people who 
acknowledge themselves to be within the middle-income strata in their own 
nations, but who from relative perspectives are in the upper-middle class and to 
some extent even super-rich by global standards. The narrative argues that the 
exclusive focus on the developed world may not align well with the policy 
prescriptions of progressive global wealth tax aimed at correcting issues of global 
income disparities between richer and poorer countries: the latter nations being 
ultra-wealthy by global standards. The idea of a global wealth tax is not only 
tainted with enforcement issues but also with concerns about credibility. It is 
politically implausible because the fundamental causes of global inequality like 
colonialism are not taken into account: “Piketty argues that capitalism is unfair. 
Wasn’t colonialism unfair, too?”,  
Rogoff concludes that “In accepting Piketty’s premise that inequality 
matters more than growth, one needs to remember that many developing-
country citizens rely on rich-country growth to help them escape poverty. The 
first problem of the twenty-first century remains to help the dire poor in Africa 
and elsewhere. By all means, the elite 0.1% should pay much more in taxes, but 
let us not forget that when it comes to reducing global inequality, the capitalist 
system has had an impressive three decades”. Two insights from the about 
citation merit critical emphasis: (a) the ambiguous role of capitalism as an 
instrument for developed nations to lifting less developed countries out of 
poverty and (b) the justification that inequality also matters more than growth in 
the fight against poverty in developing countries. The former is engaged in 
Section 4 while the latter is consistent with the second question of Section 3 
highlighted above, which we now address.  
On the second issue, developing countries also matter as much as 
developed nations in the celebration of Piketty because inequality, it is claimed, 
also matters more than growth in the fight against poverty in less developed 
countries. This statement arises from the arguments of Piketty on developed 
countries which are consistent with a growing stream of the literature on 
developing nations emphasising the need to articulate inequality in the poverty-
growth nexus (see Fosu, 2015a; Thorbecke, 2013; Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007). 
These currents include, among others: the critical role of inequality in the 
alleviation of poverty (Ali & Thorbecke, 2000; Datt & Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 
1993); the essence of income-inequality in the growth elasticities of poverty 
(Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Fosu, 2015) and policy-making (Adam, 2004). 
Therefore, the coverage of more developed nations by Piketty is consistent with 
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evolving currents from African countries (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and 
broader samples of developing nations (Fosu, 2010c).  
Given that clarifying the second question of this section is crucial for the 
present study, we devote another paragraph to engaging the underlying literature 
analytically. It can be summarised by as much as in developed countries, in 
developing nations inequality also matters more than growth in poverty 
mitigation. Accordingly, a recent stream of empirical literature has established 
that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality, 
since the inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than the growth elasticity of 
poverty. In essence: “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to 
income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818); “The 
responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and 
the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of 
poverty” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, high initial levels of inequality 
limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality 
increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11).  
In light of the above, the Fosu conclusions on developing countries 
converge with Piketty’s literature and Lewis’ caution: “Output may be growing, 
and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer” (Lewis, 1955). These 
intersections of Piketty, Lewis and Fosu are consistent with a growing stream of 
literature on post-2015 sustainable development goals (Ozgur et al., 2009; 
Timmons et al., 2009; Monika & Bobbin, 2012; Bagnara, 2012; Singh, 2014; 
Miller, 2014). Therefore, in charting the pattern towards greater industrialisation, 
there is an urgent policy syndrome in developed as well as in developing nations 
of accounting for inequality in the growth effect on poverty (Asongu, 2015a). 
Within the context of the present study, it entails incorporating some capitalism-
motivated rationales for asymmetric development that may dampen the effects of 
growth on poverty 
4. Underpinnings for ‘rational asymmetric development’ and ‘spirit of 
poverty’   
In this section, we: (i) elucidate the concept of rational asymmetric 
development employed in the study; (ii) engage the rationale of asymmetric 
development in capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight on the one hand and on the 
other hand, (iii) the implications of capital flight in increasing poverty with 
particular emphasis on case studies from resource-rich and high-growth African 
countries. The hypothesis of increasing poverty levels which motivates this 
inquiry is substantiated in the fourth strand with hard facts from a recent World 
Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal extreme 
poverty target. As highlighted in Section 3, it is also fundamental to understand 
the ambiguous role of capitalism as an instrument by developed nations to lifting 
less developed countries out of poverty. Hence, a fifth strand in the section is 
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devoted to briefly discussing the ambiguity of foreign aid when illicit capital flight 
outweighs economic growth.  
The first strand above provides some framework for the conception of 
‘rational asymmetric development’ employed. Within the context of the paper, it 
refers to unfair practices in globalisation adopted by advanced nations to the 
detriment and impoverishment of less developed countries. The interested reader 
can find more insights into capitalism-driving rational asymmetry in ‘Making 
Globalization Work’ (Stiglitz, 2007) where “The average European cow gets a 
subsidy of $2 a day; more than half of the people in the developing world live on 
less than that. It appears that it is better to be a cow in Europe than to be a poor 
person in a developing country” (p. 85). Moreover, “Without subsidies, it would 
not pay for the United States to produce cotton; with them, the United States is, 
as we have noted, the world's largest cotton exporter” (p.85). The Chang (2007) 
‘Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism’ 
also clearly articulates the asymmetric development position adopted by this 
study. An interesting African narrative is told by Mshomba (2011) who has 
provided a systematic review of relations between Africa and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).  
In the second strand, the rationale for asymmetric development in 
capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight is driven substantially by a plethora of 
factors, among others: tax evasion by multinationals and investment of siphoned 
funds by African public officials in markets with security and high turnover. (i) 
Multinational corporations in Africa have been using questionable accounting 
practices to declare low profits and hence pay less tax to domestic governments. 
This engenders negative implications for economic sustainability in domestic 
economies (Osabuohien et al., 2013, 2014, 2015). (ii) There is a growing stream 
of literature claiming that a substantial chunk of the wealth siphoned off by 
corrupt African officials is deposited in offshore financial centres that are under 
the jurisdictions of OECD nations (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003). Hence, the off-
shore financial centres are politically and economically managed by the 
corresponding OECD nations. The interested reader can find more insights 
substantiating this study by the European Network on Debt and Development 
on addressing development’s ‘black hole’ through capital flight regulation 
(EURODAD, 2008). Features of capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight 
documented in the report include, inter alia: tax havens, investment and abusive 
transfer pricing, tax concessions, the emergence of hedge funds together with 
private equity, speculation and volatility, capital account liberalisation and its 
implications, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMFs) failure in financial 
regulation and surveillance, European countries facilitating capital flight and 
regulatory failures in private equity and hedge funds. The above narrative can be 
summarised in one sentence: asymmetric development is fundamentally driven by 
capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight practices. The poverty implications of such 
practices are worth elucidating. 
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The third strand discusses the implications of capital flight in increasing 
poverty and inequality, with particular emphasis on case studies from resource-
rich and high-growth African countries. We first briefly discuss why capitalism-
motivated illicit capital flight dampens the growth effects on poverty before 
presenting some case studies. Consistent with Asongu (2014d), capital flight has 
substantially increased inequality in less developed countries owing to regressive 
effects in wealth distribution. In line with the narrative, individuals that indulge in 
such activities for the most part are among the politico-economic elites who have 
been taking advantage of privileged positions to siphon off and channel stolen 
funds to more advanced countries. According to the underlying literature (Boyce 
& Ndikumana, 1998, 2001), the acquisition and transfer of such funds very often 
entails legally questionable practices like trade misinvoicing (or falsification of 
trade documents), kickbacks on private and public contracts and embezzlement 
of export income. The unappealing consequences from shortages in income and 
unfavourable foreign exchange terms engender a higher negative weight on the 
poorer faction of citizens. Moreover, Asongu (2014d) has sustained that the 
regressive effect of illicit capital flight is further strengthened by financial 
imbalances which culminate in devaluations that have a less negative effect on the 
wealthy because they often possess foreign assets that insulate them from the 
unappealing effects.  
We now discuss some country-specific cases in which economic growth has 
been accompanied with substantial capital flight leading to low levels of wellbeing 
and lack of basic needs. In line with Ndikumana and Boyce (2012), resource-rich 
countries in Africa have been associated with the highlighted features. We 
consider the examples of Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Gabon, 
which are among Africa’s wealthiest countries. Congo, Gabon and Equatorial 
Guinea are 15th, 5th and 2nd respectively with corresponding per capita incomes 
of $1,253, $4,176 and $8,649. These countries have also been endowed with 
massive oil reserves, ranking 7th, 8th and 10th for Gabon, Congo and Equatorial 
Guinea respectively. Meanwhile citizens of these nations are living in abject 
conditions. They are lacking elementary schools, drinkable water, basic social 
services, decent sanitation and health care. In terms of population immunisation 
against measles, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea rank second- and third-to-the last 
with 55 percent and 51 percent respectively. Moreover, the odds of a child 
reaching his/her fifth day are higher in Equatorial Guinea relative to the sub-
Saharan African average.  
It is also important to devote space for an in-depth analysis of how capital 
flight has reduced the quality of growth in the three countries. The Quality of 
Growth rankings recently published by the IMF show deterioration in the 
positions of these underlying countries between 1990 and 2011 (Mlachila et al., 
2014, p.27). From a comparative assessment of 93 developing nations in the 
periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2011, the performance of 
these countries has worsened over these periods. Congo Republic (59th, 70th, 
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74th and 84th); Equatorial Guinea (76th, 73rd, 76th and 88th) and Gabon (58th, 
61st, 67th and 69th) respectively. 
The hypothesis of increasing poverty which motivates this inquiry is 
substantiated in the fourth strand with hard facts from a recent World Bank 
report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme 
poverty targets which, as has been said, revealed that extreme poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world, with the exception of Africa, where 45 
percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are substantially off-track from 
achieving the MDG extreme poverty target. As shown in Figure 1 below, 
whereas extreme poverty has been declining in all regions of the world, it has 
unfortunately been increasing in SSA. This is despite over two decades of growth 
resurgence that began in the mid 1990s (Fosu, 2015a, p.44). It follows that the 
African continent is still the poorest in the world, in spite of recent narratives of 
the continent being one year ahead of time in the MDG poverty target 
(Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014). This stream of optimistic literature has 
substantially drawn from currents in Africa rising (Leautier, 2012) and an African 
growth miracle (Young, 2012), which might have been more concerned with 
articulating neoliberal ideology and capital accumulation while neglecting more 
fundamental ethical concerns like inequality, unemployment and ecological decay 
(Obeng-Odoom, 2013, 2014). Whereas responses to the dismal poverty trend on 
the continent have included a new stream of literature on reinventing foreign aid 
for a more inclusive post-2015 development agenda (Simpasa et al., 2015; Jones 
et al., 2015; Jones & Tarp, 2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015; Page & Shimeles, 
2015), we argue that it is necessary to balance this new stream of foreign aid 
literature with fundamental concerns of illicit capital flight.  
In the fifth strand, we briefly discuss the ambiguity of foreign aid in 
mitigating poverty in situations where capital flight is higher than economic 
growth. Though the stated purpose of this study is not to discuss the issue of 
foreign aid, unfortunately we cannot resist assessing the political economy of 
development assistance because foreign aid is a substantial dichotomy of illicit 
capital flight. Accordingly, there is mainstream consensus that capital flight is 
about tenfold the annual development assistance flows and twofold the amount 
of debt repaid by developing economies annually (Diak, 2014). A recent 
theoretical postulation that capitalism-driven debts fuel inequality (Azzimonti et 
al., 2014) has been verified and confirmed in Africa (Asongu et al., 2015). The 
fact that Africa is a net creditor to the rest of the world is now a widely accepted 
economic fact in academic and policy circles (Asongu, 2014d). In what follows, 
we briefly discuss the paradox of capital flight in a capital-starved African 
continent before extending the implications of Piketty to Africa in the light of the 
literature we have analytically engaged this far.  
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Figure 1: Comparative regional poverty levels 
 
 
 
5. The paradox of African capital flight and extension of Piketty  
5.1  The paradox of capital flight from a capital-starved Africa  
Consistent with Asiedu et al. (2012), a reason for Africa’s 
underdevelopment is lack of investment capital. In accordance with the Harrod-
Domar model, three arguments have been put forward: (i) the continent has a 
financing gap because invested capital is less than the capital required for 
investment in sustainable growth; (ii) long-term development can be achieved if 
the financing gap is filled and (iii) in order to bridge the financing gap, Africa 
would need external capital in the form of debts and development assistance. 
Hence, there have been recurrent calls for more foreign aid and attempts at 
attracting other forms of financing, like foreign direct investment (FDI) or long-
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term capital from domestic financial markets, which have not been very 
successful (Asiedu, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012; Darley, 
2012). Consistent with this description, the relevance of external capital in 
African development is clearly articulated in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Figure 2 
below highlights the position that illicit capital flows have been increasing at the 
higher rate relative to FDI and foreign aid.  
 
Figure 2: Illicit Capital Flight (ICF), Foreign Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI): Average Annual per Country Flows, 1970-2008 (million, constant 2008 $) 
 
Source: Asiedu et al. (2012) 
 
Consistent with Asiedu et al. (2012), reliance on external financing to 
address the investment needs to fight poverty in Africa is problematic for at least 
three reasons. First, foreign aid and FDI are volatile and volatility has adverse 
consequences on economies (see Kangoye, 2013). Second, an extensive literature 
on growth shows that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is 
ambiguous, with provocative titles like ‘foreign aid follies’ (Rogoff, 2014b), 
sceptical conclusions from surveys, documenting literature on more than 40 years 
of foreign aid (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008, 2009) or the debates (Asongu, 
2014e) and clarifications (Asongu, 2015b) on the questionable economics of 
foreign aid for inclusive human development in Africa. Third, the region has 
made very unsuccessful attempts at attracting FDI. There is an interesting stream 
of FDI (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012) and African business (Rolfe & 
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Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 2013a) literature supporting this 
position.  
We conclude that given previous unsuccessful attempts at attracting 
external flows, the trend is not very likely to change. Hence, it is unrealistic to 
substantially rely on external finance for investment needs in the short- and 
medium-terms. In proposing a solution, the authors have recommended that sub-
Saharan African nations establish effective strategies toward mitigating illicit 
capital flight within the framework of a broader agenda of resource mobilization 
for economic development. Extending the implications of Piketty with Solow-
Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana is a step towards consolidating this 
recommendation.  
5.2   Extending Piketty with Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana 
It is interesting to first of all clarify the conjectures of Boyce-Fofack-
Ndikumana and Solow-Swan before discussing how the underpinnings are 
relevant in extending the implications of Piketty.  
First, the concept of catch-up or convergence motivated by Solow-Swan 
(1956) builds from an assumption of diminishing returns, such that less 
developed countries are endowed with a higher marginal capital productivity. In 
this light, due to similar levels of savings, poor economies are expected to grow 
faster relative to their developed counterparts. Hence, a negative correlation is 
expected between initial income levels and future growth rates. Therefore, the 
extension of Piketty in this study is typically consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings employed in cross-country income convergence literature (Solow, 
1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Fung, 2009) which has been recently extended to other fields 
of development, notably: financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 
2012), intellectual property rights (Asongu, 2013b; Andrés & Asongu, 2013), 
forecasting of political crisis (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015), knowledge economy 
(Asongu, 2013c) and inclusive human development (Asongu, 2014f). In this light, 
extending Piketty’s work is within this recent stream of literature employing the 
theoretical underpinnings of Solow-Swan within broader development 
frameworks.  
The use of Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana is to emphasis studies which to the 
best of our knowledge have substantially enriched the literature on African capital 
flight. Hence, it is neither meant to underestimate contributions from other 
authors in this research area nor to consider works of underlying authors as 
supreme relative to those of their peers in the field. Therefore, the analogy as far 
as we have reviewed is limited to our knowledge at the time of this study.  
The extension of Piketty is a three-step exposition: conclusion, implication 
and recommendation. Piketty has concluded that (i) when the return to capital is 
higher than the growth rate, inequality increases. Hence, (ii) the poor cannot 
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catch-up with the rich. He has proposed an ideal solution (iii) of progressive 
income taxation (targeting the return on capital) that is based on automatic 
exchange of bank information. As an extension, (i) we postulate that when the 
return on political economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher 
than the growth rate, there is asymmetric development between rich and poor 
countries. (ii) Therefore, poor countries in Africa may not catch-up with the 
West. (iii) The ideal analogy proposed in tackling the spirit of African poverty is a 
full commitment to fighting illicit capital flight based on an automatic exchange 
of bank information. Hence, contrary to the theoretical underpinnings of 
exogenous growth models, catch-up may not be so apparent unless missing 
aggregate savings are restored through genuine commitments to fighting illicit 
capital flight. This has important implications for the upward bias in endogenous 
development.  
5.3   Implications for the upward bias in endogenous development and 
catch-up 
Contrary to some evidence documenting catch-up by African countries 
with a direct assessment of questions like “Is Africa Actually Developing?” (Alan 
& Carlyn, 2015, p. 598), there are strong arguments with which to suggest that it 
is not. While the underlying literature sustains that Africa is catching-up because 
it is experiencing a higher growth rate relative to developed countries or declining 
poverty relative to other regions of the world (Fosu, 2015a)6, this catch-up may 
not be so apparent when a fraction of GDP lost to illicit capital flight is factored-
in. A natural criticism that may arise could be whether the corresponding illicit 
capital flight is deducted from GDP ex-ante or ex-post of per capita GDP 
convergence estimations. Accordingly, corruption from African elites has been 
documented to substantially derive from the inflation of consumption and 
investment components of GDP (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003). Boyce and 
Ndikumana have documented an interesting literature on public debts and 
private assets as core determinants of capital flight in Sub-Saharan African 
nations.  
It is logical to infer that a substantial amount of siphoned funds is 
considered ex-ante of GDP per capita computations and hence, illicit capital 
flight is part of reported GDP. It follows that if illicit capital flows from an 
economy are higher than the growth rate of the underlying economy, catch-up 
with developed countries will remain elusive. This inference is based on the 
assumption that illicit capital flows are hidden in tax havens based in developed 
countries. We have already alluded to why illicit capital flight is: (i) higher than 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the period of catch-up advanced by Fosu (2015a) is consistent with 
the sample periodicity (or from the mid-1990s) during which Africa has experienced 
growth resurgence. This is consistent with the earlier position by Alan and Carlyn (2015) 
of Africa catching-up with the USA from the mid-1990s. 
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economic growth and (ii) deposited for the most part in developed nations in the 
introductory section. Moreover, there is a substantial body of literature 
confirming that a great portion of illicit capital flows are deposited in OECD 
countries (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003). As an implication, there may be an 
upward or positive bias in the endogenous GDP of African nations used in the 
convergence literature. This may partly explain why Africa’s growth miracle has 
been underestimated by about 400 percent (Young, 2012) and goes a long way to 
casting some shadow on recent findings establishing that Africa is on time for the 
MDG extreme poverty target (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014).  
In order to understand the wider implications of the above in the catch-up 
literature, it is important to extend the analysis beyond the light of income 
convergence and engage how the inferences reflect the scarce human 
development catch-up literature. Consistent with Asongu (2014f), by 2008, 
Konya and Guisan (2008, p. 9) acknowledged that only three studies had 
examined catch-up in living standards, notably: Mazumdar (2002), Sutcliffe 
(2004) and Noorbakhsh (2006). Following Konya and Guisan, to the best of our 
knowledge, only three more studies have been added to the scarce literature on 
human development catch-up. These include: Mayer-Foulkes (2010), Clark (2011) 
and Asongu (2014f).  
Mazumdar (2002) examined if the human development index (HDI) 
converged during the period 1960-1995 in 91 countries and concluded on the 
absence of convergence. Sutcliffe (2004) has also rebuffed the idea of the HDI 
convergence in 99 countries using a more updated sample (1975-2001). 
According to Sutcliffe, the idea of HDI convergence may be a hidden agenda of 
some multilateral organisations like the IMF to reduce the acknowledged 
setbacks of the long-run world economic history. In the same vein, the idea of 
catch-up between Africa and the West, given appalling rates of African capital 
flight, may be partly explained by the elucidations of Sutcliffe. The findings of 
Noorbakhsh (2006) have been subject to many criticisms (Konya & Guisan, 
2008, pp. 28-29).  
Hobijn and Franses (2001) and Neumayer (2003) have also assessed catch-
up in living standards. While the former have established the presence of 
divergence in living standards, the latter has argued that living standards be 
viewed from a broader spectrum and not limited to a simple index. Asongu 
(2014f) who has assessed catch-up in inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) in African 
countries has concluded that the income component of the IHDI moves slower 
than others and hence requires more policy intervention. In light of the above, 
the debate on catch-up in development remains widely open. Hence, our 
postulations after extending Piketty’s implications to the nexus between Africa 
and developed countries are quite plausible.  
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6. Conclusion  
This study has assessed the inequality problem in light of policy 
implications from Piketty’s celebrated ‘Capital in the 21st century’. We have first 
situated Piketty in post- Washington Consensus models. Next, we have presented 
a case for the missing dimension of developing countries in the underlying 
literature. The study has then reconciled the conclusions of Piketty with Solow-
Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana in the catch-up and capital flight literatures 
respectively. We have also analogically demonstrated that consistent with the 
underlying literature, when the return on political economy (or capitalism-fuelled 
illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate, it would be difficult for Africa 
to catch-up with the West. In our view, the spirit of African poverty is in rational 
asymmetric development between rich and poor countries.  
It is not the purpose of this study to deny some important successes in 
human development which Africa has experienced over the past decades, such as 
a reduction of infant mortality and progress in life expectancy, educational 
enrolment and information and communication technology. The main aim has 
been to lay some foundations for the extension of Piketty’s work to other 
developing countries. The logical postulations advanced in this paper have been 
based on verifiable and justifiable stylized facts. Whether they withstand in-depth 
empirical scrutiny is an interesting future research question.  
An important personality that would easily subscribe to this analysis is the 
former IMF director and former German president, Horst Köhler whom we cite 
in verbatim confirming ‘rational asymmetric development’ with regard to poverty 
in Africa: “And third, there is an African proverb: ‘Beware of the naked man who 
offers you clothes.’ And my goodness, we Europeans are naked, with our double 
standards and our comfortable hypocrisy vis-à-vis our past and present 
contribution to Africa’s problems. It is high time we regained our credibility. 
Take corruption: combatting corruption is not a one-way street. Corruption in 
Africa also comes in the guise of representatives of Western corporations and 
European bank accounts, so we cannot ignore the global kleptocratic model of 
capitalism that is sucking obscene amounts of capital out of Africa in particular – 
and certainly more than is being invested in the continent as development 
assistance. Chief among the beneficiaries of this flight of capital are the European 
banks where African despots and tax-evading corporations stash their billions. If 
we finally brought order to the international financial system and allowed the tax 
havens to wither away, that would be credible!” (BMBF, 2014, p. 30).  
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